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TheValue of Imprecise Prediction
Alkistis Elliott-Graves∗
The traditional philosophy of science approach to prediction leaves little room for appreciat-
ing the value and potential of imprecise predictions. At best, they are considered a stepping
stone to more precise predictions, while at worst they are viewed as detracting from the sci-
entific quality of a discipline. The aim of this paper is to show that imprecise predictions
are undervalued in philosophy of science. I review the conceptions of imprecise predictions
and the main criticisms levelled against them: (i) that they cannot aid in model selection
and improvement, and (ii) that they cannot support effective interventions in practical de-
cision making. I will argue against both criticisms, showing that imprecise predictions
have a circumscribed but important and legitimate place in the study of complex, heteroge-
neous systems. The argument is illustrated and supported by an example from conservation
biology, where imprecise models were instrumental in saving the kōkako from extinction.
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1 Introduction
Prediction is important because it constitutes a fundamental facet of scientific practice and an in-
tegral feature of the evaluation of scientific theories across many scientific disciplines. However,
the notion of prediction in philosophy of science and scientific practice is defined quite narrowly;
useful predictions are precise, risky, and novel (Hitchcock and Sober 2004; Lipton 2008; Barrett
and Stanford 2006). These characteristics are thought to be crucial when predictions are used
to test or confirm theories, their traditional role in philosophy of science (Douglas and Mag-
nus 2013; Lipton 2008; Douglas 2009). Predictions that lack these characteristics consequently
receive much less attention, and predominantly negative at that.
One such group is imprecise predictions.1 These are predictions of the existence of a phenom-
enon, effect or change, without a precise specification of its extent or magnitude. They can take
1Sometimes, imprecise predictions are referred to as ‘generic’ (e.g., in economics, see Rosenberg 1989) or ‘qual-
itative’ (e.g., in economics and ecology, see Orzack and Sober 1993; Gonzalez 2015; Dambacher et al. 2003). As
we shall see, many of these terms are quite loaded. The most important of these implications is that they tend
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the form of trends, ranges or imprecisely probabilistic statements. They occur in a number of
sciences, especially those that investigate complex, heterogeneous systems, such as economics,
ecology and climate science. For example, imprecise predictions in economics are usually de-
scribed as predictions of the existence of a phenomenon, process, or entity, that do not include
any additional specific detail. They “identify the direction inwhich changesmove, without how-
ever, identifying the magnitude of these directions” (Rosenberg 1989). A standard example of
an imprecise predictive statement in economics is: ‘an increase in tax rate will decrease the firm’s
output’ (without specification of how much the output will decrease) (Rosenberg 1989, 53). In
ecology, imprecise predictions are the outputs of mathematical models, such as optimality mod-
els, loop analysis, and fuzzy interaction webs ( Justus 2006; Dambacher, Li, and Rossignol 2003;
Ramsey et al. 2012; Levins 1974; Puccia and Levins 1986). The predictions are trends (i.e., the
population will increase/decrease given x, y, z) or ranges (the population will increase by more
than x%; the population will decrease by between y and z%). Climate scientists use models to
make imprecise predictions about climate variables, such as temperature or precipitation. For ex-
ample, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s fifth report (2013) included
the prediction that it is likely (i.e., 60–100% chance) that by 2100 the mean global temperature
would rise by between 2.67–4.87°C.
The prevailing attitude towards imprecise predictions is to ignore, dismiss, or criticize them.
Philosophers have tended to view them as mathematically unsound, opaque and untrustworthy.
For example, in a recent book on economic predictions, Gonzales (2015) defines imprecise
predictions as follows:
1) The predictions do not follow, in principle, clear rules, because they commonly
rely on an intuitive point of view; 2) the subjects … state the future events based on
their own experience; 3) the prediction does not detail explicitly how the available
information is incorporated into prediction. (58)
At best, they are seen as a preliminary step, to be further refined by more precise quantitative
approaches. A famous example of this position comes from Rosenberg’s attack of generic pre-
dictions in economics:
Generic predictions are predictions of the existence of a phenomenon, process, or
entity, as opposed to specific predictions about its detailed character …. This lack
of specificity is a weakness in generic theories. … Generic prediction is something,
it is a start, but it is not enough. And economists should not be satisfied with it.
(1989, 53–55)
Similarly, Orzack and Sober (1993) criticized imprecise (here termed ‘qualitative’) models in
ecology as “not mathematical” (538), while “the idea of qualitative modeling has hindered the
development of an unbiased assessment of the truth” (543). They argued that grounds for ac-
cepting qualitative predictions are often left unstated and thus inherently suspect:
The most important defect in qualitative testing … is that it fails to allow one to
answer the most important question about a particular model: How well does that
model explain the data? Qualitative testing may show some models are incompat-
ible with data, but only quantitative testing of quantitative models can determine
what one if any sufficiently explains the data. (542)
to be viewed dichotomously and one side of the dichotomy is thought to lack certain other characteristics (e.g.,
mathematics). In order to avoid these semantic quibbles, I will be using the term ‘imprecise’ to refer to predic-
tions that have a certain level of imprecision (though in the spirit of accurate representation, I will retain the other
terminology when outlining existing accounts).
 OPEN ACCESS - PTPBIO.ORG
ELLIOTT-GRAVES: THE VALUE OF IMPRECISE PREDICTION 3
For many scientists, reliance on imprecise predictions is seen as a cause of discord within a dis-
cipline, or even contributing to the demarcation of a field as ‘soft’ or ‘unscientific’ (Peters 1991;
Valéry, Fritz, and Lefeuvre 2013; Lipsey 2001; Houlahan et al. 2017; discussion in Winther
2011). For example, Houlahan et al. (2017) criticize their own field (ecology) as not being
sufficiently scientific, because it does not pay enough attention to quantitative prediction:
The lack of emphasis on prediction has resulted in a discipline that tests qualitative,
imprecise hypotheses with little concern for whether the results are generalizable
beyond where and when the data were collected.” (1)2
They add that:
A new commitment to prediction in ecology would lead to, … more mature (i.e.,
quantitative) hypotheses, prioritization of modeling techniques that are more ap-
propriate for prediction … and, ultimately, advancement towards a more general
understanding of the natural world. (1)
A less extreme version of this view is echoed implicitly when scientists argue that a particular
science needs to improve its predictive power and suggesting that this can be achieved by in-
creasing the precision of its predictions (Colander et al. 2009; Gurevitch et al. 2011; Hayes and
Barry 2007; Evans, Norris, and Benton 2012; Kolar and Lodge 2002). Further evidence of im-
plicit distrust comes from the small number of papers that explicitly advocate the use of models
that yield imprecise predictions, and from the ways in which scientists express themselves when
they do use them. In many cases, the tone of a paper that produces imprecise predictions is
apologetic, highlighting the novelty of the concept or theory being used, or the immature state
of the science (see for example Loiselle et al. 2000).
The aim of this paper is to defend a certain subset of imprecise predictions. I start by ex-
amining the existing conceptions of imprecise predictions (including qualitative and generic)
and classify them in terms of their level of precision (section 2). I then outline the two main
criticisms that can be levelled against them: (i) that they are insufficiently risky and therefore
cannot be used in model selection or improvement and (ii) that they do not support effective in-
terventions in practical decision making (section 3). In section 4, I defend imprecise predictions
by showing both that they can be risky and effectively support interventions. In section 5, I will
examine a residual concern, namely that imprecise predictions are only useful in a very specific,
non-ideal set of circumstances, hence it is still better to aim for precision in our predictions,
whenever possible. I will argue, following Levins (1966), that the reasons we cannot reach this
ideal lie in the systems themselves, rather than the methods scientists use to investigate them.
Thus, imprecise predictions have a limited but important role in scientific practice.
2 Defining Imprecise Predictions
Defining imprecise predictions is not straightforward. In fields such as Business, Management
and some social sciences, imprecise predictions are the results of qualitative research methods
such as interviews, questionnaires and the construction of narratives, i.e., methods that do not
involve quantification (Patton 2014). Here, predictions are interpretations of this information
by experts. Experts gather all the information they deem relevant and make an ‘educated guess’
about the existence of a phenomenon in the future, or the direction in which it will change.
2I should note that here, ‘hypothesis’ refers to outputs of models and experiments, hence it is synonymous with
‘prediction’.
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Examples include the extrapolation of case studies from one area to another, such as the predic-
tion (by experts) that the programme for improving infant nutrition in Tamil Nadu by educating
mothers would also improve infant nutrition in Bangladesh (Cartwright 2012).3 As these are
cases where there is no discernible and systematic method that gives rise to the prediction, this
is one category of imprecise predictions I will not be defending. Instead, I am interested in im-
precise predictions that appear in predominantly quantitative disciplines, such as ecology, eco-
nomics, and climate change (see examples in Introduction). These predictions are the outputs
of mathematical models, hence imprecise model predictions. They deserve to be defended because
they are seen as being in direct competition with highly precise predictions and come off much
worse, as they are tarred with the same brush as the ‘expert intuition’ predictions mentioned
above.
In order to define imprecise predictions, we must first take a closer look at the notion of
precision, a concept that is itself difficult to define, as it also is used in a number of different
ways (Matthewson and Weisberg 2009). First, precision in a model can refer to the parameters
in the model (parameter precision) or the output of the model (output precision) (Matthewson
and Weisberg 2009). In the context of imprecise model predictions, the output of the model
is the most relevant, as predictions are the outputs of models. Yet there are links between para-
meter and output precision, namely that imprecise specifications of parameters tend to produce
imprecisely specified outputs. Of course, this is not always the case; it is possible for models
with finely specified parameters to produce imprecise predictions (e.g., interval rather than point
predictions, or families of models that produce precise but different outputs, that are expressed
imprecisely when amalgamated). Nonetheless, as parameter imprecision can affect output im-
precision, we are interested in the former insofar as it affects the latter.
Second, is precision dichotomous or a matter of degree? Orzack and Sober, in their 1993
criticism of Levins, seem to suggest that it is dichotomous, as they define a model as precise if it
‘generates point predictions for output parameters’ and imprecise if it does not (534). However,
I think it is much more useful to think of precision as a matter of degree. Predicting that an
effect will increase rather than decrease is less precise than predicting that it will increase by
more than 3%, which is in turn less precise than predicting that it will increase by 3.528%.
Third, why are a number of models imprecise? We can think of imprecision as a way of
representing uncertainty in our models. In general terms, uncertainty refers to an epistemic lim-
itation, i.e., lack of knowledge about the accuracy of a claim or method. Uncertainty in models
can pertain to model inputs, i.e., uncertainty about the types of parameters that should be in-
cluded in the model and/or uncertainty about the values these parameters should take (Parker
2010; Parker and Risbey 2015). Often, parameter imprecision is inversely related to uncertainty
as parameters in a model are defined more precisely as our uncertainty about them decreases
(Matthewson and Weisberg 2009).4 More importantly, uncertainty can refer to model outputs.
Here, output imprecision is a reflection of our uncertainty regarding the effect we are predicting
(Smith and Stern 2011; Regan, Colyvan, and Burgman 2002; Parker 2010). This uncertainty
3In this case, the prediction failed, because the experts did not consider the relevant differences between Tamil
Nadu and Bangladesh, such as the fact that educating mothers would not cause a shift in practice in Bangladesh,
because they do not have control over shopping or food distribution within the household.
4Consider, for example, the exponential growth model, described by the equation dN/dt = rN . This equation
describes how a population N grows if it is affected only by the intrinsic growth rate r. The value of r is different
for each population, and it is calculated from data on birth rates, death rates and fecundity. However, this data is
often patchy or incomplete, so scientists might not be certain about the precise value of r. Thus, a complete set of
data will allow scientists to express r precisely to many decimal points, e.g., 1.35862, whereas patchier data sets will
be expressed less precisely, e.g., as (1.30 ± 0.01) where r ranges from 1.29 to 1.31. In cases of higher uncertainty,
r can be expressed as (1.3 ± 0.1), i.e., the range from 1.2 to 1.4, and so on.
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can be expressed in a number of ways, the most common of which are: (i) imprecision in terms
of the magnitude of the effect we are predicting, which can take the form of interval proba-
bility predictions, range predictions or predictions of trends, and (ii) qualitative indications of
confidence levels in the accuracy of the prediction in question (Parker and Risbey 2015).
In fact, according to Parker and Risbey (2015), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC)’s classification of uncertainty reports can be understood in terms of how precise
they are (2–3):
(a) gives a full probability density function/probability distribution over values of
X
(b) gives a range of values of X in which the future value can be expected to fall
with a precisely specified probability, such as 0.95
(c) gives a range of values of X in which the future value can be expected to fall
with an imprecise or interval probability, such as 0.6–0.9, or with a qualitative
level of confidence, e.g., medium
(d) gives a range of values ofX that can be considered plausible but indicates that
probabilities cannot be assigned
(e) gives an order of magnitude estimate of the future value of X but indicates
that more precise estimates are out of reach
(f ) indicates that the future value of X will be greater than (or less than) the
current value, though by how much is unclear
(g) admits that almost nothing is known about the future value of X
This list is a classification of output uncertainty in decreasing levels of precision, i.e., the more
uncertain we are about our model outputs, the more imprecise their values. The first point to
note is that it shows that a dichotomous notion of precision is unlikely to be useful for predictions
under conditions of uncertainty. If precision were dichotomous, then where would the cut-off
be? Does the inclusion of probability automatically make a prediction imprecise? Even if it
does, this does not mean that all non-precise predictions are equally imprecise. After all, of
the main advantages of introducing probabilities into prediction is so that we can differentiate
between different levels of imprecision.
Examining the list itself, how does each level relate to imprecise predictions? Starting at
the bottom, (g) can be excluded because it does not involve prediction, imprecise or otherwise.
Moving up, (f ) is probably the most uncontroversial way to characterize an imprecise prediction.
It tells about the quality of the change (more or less, plus or minus, greater or lesser) but nothing
about the quantity of the change. An example could be: average global temperature will increase
in the next 10 years. The next level (e) is more precise, but only slightly. There is still no
quantitative information about the change, just a more precise qualitative modifier. For example,
the average global temperature will increase more over the next 10 years than in the last 10 years.
Similarly for (d), even though X is expressed in terms of a range of numerical values, there
is no quantification of uncertainty. We might be able to give a qualitative statement of our
expectation for X coming about, e.g., low, medium, high, but this type of statement is not
probabilistic. In fact, this type of statement can be distinguished from a confidence interval (as
in level (c)), where the qualitative statement is attached to an (imprecise) probability. Here, the
qualitative statement is less precise as it refers to the effect itself, rather than our confidence in
the probabilistic estimate of the effect. In addition, it may only make sense within a particular
context, for example, the statement “the effect of the rat population on the possum population is
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low” might be accurate in one context (i.e., the rat, possum, kōkako (a type of bird) community
in the North Island of New Zealand) but may not be accurate in other contexts, such as the
effect of an invasive plant species on a community in Australia, where a similar effect (in terms
of reduction of population size) may be considered moderate, or even high in that context.
So far, this classification corresponds to scientists’ own classifications: levels (e) and (f ) cor-
respond to what many economists count as generic predictions. For example, IS-LM models,
historically perhaps the most influential macroeconomic models, are highly imprecise. They
represent the demand side of the economy with two equations referring to the real sector (in-
vestment and saving) and the monetary sector (liquidity preference and monetary supply) and
can be used to make predictions about the effect of fiscal and monetary policies on the equilib-
rium level of income (increase/decrease) (Vercelli 2000).
Level (d) is best exemplified by a subset of imprecise predictions in ecology (most others
correspond to (c)). An important example of (d) is loop analysis (Dambacher, Li, and Rossignol
2003; Justus 2005; Levins 1974; Puccia and Levins 1986). Here, ecologists use signed directed
graphs to represent interactions between populations in a community. The graph (and associ-
ated community matrix) can be used to identify the quality of the effect (positive (1), neutral (0),
negative (−1))) of each population on the others and to predict the effects of perturbations of
the system, taking into account dynamic qualities of the system such as feedback. For example,
in a community of plants, kōkako, rats, possums and stoats, loop analysis can be used to deter-
mine all the interactions between each population in the community (see figure 1A) (Ramsey
and Veltman 2005). Scientists can use the conjunction of qualitative effects to determine which
predator population should be the focus of an intervention so that the prey population is saved
from extinction. In this example, loop analysis predicted that an increase in all predator popu-
lations would have a negative effect on the kōkako population, but that an increase in the rat
population would have a stronger effect than the other two predators, because it would result in
a net total of two negative feedback cycles (one from predation and one from competition); see
figure 1B.
Moving to the top end of the list, levels (a) and (b) are precise, because they provide pre-
cise probabilistic values for X . This is in line with scientific practice, where merely containing
probabilities is not a reason to think of a prediction as imprecise (Kaplan and Garrick 1981).
Introducing probabilities is a way of specifying uncertainty. The important point is that the
probabilities themselves are precise, i.e., they are point probabilities. This also goes for (b),
where the prediction is for a range of values for X . While a range of values is less precise than
a single value, the range still has a precise probabilistic value attached to it.
This leaves level (c), which is the most complicated. Some scientists might classify it as
precise merely because it includes numerical values forX . If we do not want it to count as fully
precise then we must determine what makes it different from level (b). The key difference is
that the probabilities in (c) are themselves imprecise. A probabilistic range, i.e., an interval, is
less precise than a point prediction, even if the point prediction is for a range of values. That
is, giving a range of probabilities for a range of values reflects more uncertainty than a point
prediction for the same range of values. As Parker and Risbey state, this level of imprecision
(i.e., a range) can also be equivalently expressed as a qualitative level of confidence for a point
probability.
To sum up the discussion in this section, the precise/imprecise distinction should not be
viewed as dichotomous (at least in the case of predictions), as model output imprecision comes
in degrees. Therefore, both critiques and defences of imprecise predictions should specify the
level of imprecision of the prediction in question. Inwhat follows, I will be focusing on imprecise
model predictions, which are defined as the outputs of models with a certain level of imprecision.
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A. B.
Figure 1: Loop Analysis: Signed digraph of the kōkako food web (A) and predictions from the adjoint of
the qualitative matrix (°A) of interactions from the kokako food web (B). (A) Arrows represent positive
causal links and closed circles represent negative causal links. Closed circles starting and ending at the
same variable represent self-damping (density-dependent) effects. (B) Values are the net number of
feedback cycles (positive and negative) contributing to the response in species i (rows) resulting from a
sustained positive input into species j (columns); e.g., the predicted response of a sustained increase in
ship rats is predicted to have a negative effect on kokako (i.e., a net total of two negative feedback cycles).
Adapted and reprinted with permission from Ramsey and Veltman 2005.
These are the models whose outputs correspond to levels (c)–(f ) in the above list. I hope that the
discussion so far has shown that this grouping is not arbitrary. It encompasses predictions that
are the outputs of models, not merely educated guesses, but does not include point predictions
or predictions with precise probabilities, both of which count as precise predictions. Moreover,
this grouping includes the most prominent imprecise models used by scientists in various fields,
and which are subject to the most direct critiques.
Finally, I should note once more that while some of these models and their predictions are
labelled ‘qualitative’ or ‘generic’ by the scientists who employ them, these terms can be mislead-
ing (see for example, Dambacher et al. 2003; Justus 2006; Levins 1974). Labelling a prediction
as ‘qualitative’, might intuitively imply a methodology that involves no quantification, which is
not the case in any of the models and predictions I am defending. Thus, it is best to adopt
the more neutral terminology of ‘precise’ (also maximally precise, highly precise) and ‘imprecise’
(also relatively imprecise, highly imprecise) throughout the discussion. Again, however, I will
be using the terms precise and imprecise for the sake of brevity; this is not meant to indicate a
strict dichotomy. Imprecise predictions are meant to encompass various levels of imprecision
(levels (c)–(f )), while precise predictions are meant to encompass a range of more precise predic-
tions (levels (a)–(b)). In the next two sections, I will examine which critiques can legitimately
be levelled against these predictions and provide defences from the critiques.
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3 The Case against Imprecise Predictions
If defining imprecise predictions is not straightforward, then identifying their criticisms is even
more complicated. The main difficulty is that there are few accounts that actually spell out the
criticisms in any detail or provide clear arguments against imprecise predictions. Unfortunately,
this does not mean that the critics represent a minority view, rather it shows that the critiques
have been widely accepted and entrenched in philosophical and scientific thought, so imprecise
predictions are nowadays usually just dismissed without much further thought.5 Yet this is
precisely why imprecise predictions merit a closer look. It is important to identify the strongest
criticisms that can be levelled against them and to examine whether they can be overcome.
I will focus on the two most important criticisms of imprecise predictions: (i) that they
are insufficiently risky and therefore cannot help us test models or choose between them and
(ii) that they cannot support effective interventions. They are the most important because they
correspond to the two main functions we expect of any scientific prediction, to be able to test
models/theories and to help scientists successfully intervene in real-world situations.
The first criticism addresses the traditional role afforded to prediction. Models or theories
are often developed in order to explain phenomena or patterns of data, yet the best way we have
to test them is to make predictions based on the model/theory and see if those predictions come
out true (Lipton 2005; Douglas 2009). Models/theories that consistently produce accurate pre-
dictions are considered successful. Moreover, we can compare the ‘track record’ of two or more
models/theories in order to choose which model to use in a particular context. However, accord-
ing to Orzack and Sober (1993), if we only have imprecise predictions, we cannot discriminate
between two different explanations of a set of data.6
They point to the use of optimality models in evolutionary biology, which identify the op-
timal ‘evolutionary behaviour’ for a particular context and are used to test the extent to which
natural selection rather than other evolutionary forces is the cause of a particular trait (a trait
produced by natural selection is considered optimal) (542). For example, they argue that if a
model of sex ratios predicted an optimal ratio of 0.95, but an individual produced a sex ratio of
0.6, then this would be cause for concern, and would prompt us to re-examine the model and
the data (543). However, if the model predicted the sex ratios less precisely, then the data point
of 0.6 would not be detected as a discrepancy and we would not be able to tell if this were a
real “lack of optimality” or a “misunderstanding of the biology such that the fact of optimality
is not detected” (543). They worry that the predominance of imprecise optimality models “has
hindered the development of an unbiased assessment of the truth of one of the most important
and influential hypotheses of evolutionary biology” (543).
Why are imprecise predictions not good tests of models’ explanations of data? Orzack and
Sober do not state this explicitly, but their criticism is based on a deeper issue: the notion that
in order for a prediction to count as a true test of a model or theory, it must be sufficiently risky.
Risky predictions are those that could turn out to be false, which is why they are considered
good tests. The less obvious a prediction is, given our current knowledge of the model/data, the
stronger it is as a test. An example often used in textbooks is Mendeleev’s prediction that there
were three elements yet to be discovered, with specific physical and chemical properties, such as
5The two most important explicit critiques of imprecise predictions are Rosenberg (1989) and Orzack and
Sober (1993). For implicit criticism/dismissal of imprecise predictions in ecology and economics see (Colander et
al. 2009; Evans et al. 2012; Gurevitch et al. 2011; Hayes and Barry 2007; Houlahan et al. 2017; Kolar and
Lodge 2002).
6A similar criticism can also be found in Rosenberg’s criticism of generic predictions in economics. He argues
that Keynesian macroeconomic models (such as the IS-LM) mischaracterized the relationship between unemploy-
ment and inflation, which was overlooked because of the imprecision of the predictions(1989, 56).
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atomic weights, acidity, specific gravity, etc., which would fit into in to the gaps of the periodic
table. This set of predictions is treated as an exemplar of riskiness, because there are many ways
in which it could turn out to be false: e.g., there could be fewer or more than three elements,
while each element could have different characteristics than the ones predicted.
Precision is one way of increasing the riskiness of a prediction.7 For example, we could test
a model of predation by predicting that the prey population (of, say, bison) will fall from 800
to 500 individuals (e.g., because of a conservation program, such as the introduction of wolves),
then rise to 750 individuals (because of the corresponding drop in predator population after the
initial drop in prey population). We can then observe the population and collect the relevant
data. If the actual prey population does drop to 500 and then rise to 750, we have good reasons
to think that the model has latched on to the relevant causal factors of the actual system. If,
on the other hand, the population does not eventually rise, or rises to much more or less than
750 individuals (say 900 or 500), then this would mean that there is something wrong with our
model. (I am assuming, for the sake of the argument, that we have not made any mistakes in the
collection, measurement or interpretation of data.) Moreover, we can use precise predictions to
choose between competing models. For example, if we had a second quantitative model which
that the prey population would fall to 650 individuals, then we would have a clear reason to
favour of the first model, because the first would be more accurate than the second.
Contrast this with a model that predicts only that the prey population will fall, if a predator
population is introduced. This is not a completely trivial or risk-free prediction. It could be
false if the prey population rose to more than its initial size. However, it would be true whether
the population fell to 0, 200, 400 or 750 individuals, so it much easier to confirm. This is
problematic because it doesn’t provide us with a good enough test of our model. A drop in
the prey population to 200 individuals could be because of a different mechanism than a drop
to 750 individuals, but the imprecise model and its corresponding prediction would not help
us distinguish between the two cases. Nor would it help us to choose between two imprecise
models that both predicted a drop in prey population after the introduction of predators.
The second criticism is the worry that scientists need precise predictions in order to ac-
curately anticipate phenomena or changes in real-world systems, so that they can effectively
intervene to deal with the situation. The idea is that imprecise model predictions are not always
sufficiently informative for effective interventions.8 There are two ways in which this criticism
can be understood. The first is as a practical extension of the first criticism. An imprecise model
prediction might point to a correct trend, yet obscure the actual causes of the phenomenon, so
an intervention based on that model would be ineffective. Going back to the predation example,
the population drop in the prey could be caused by a completely different factor, say a parasite.
This would probably cause a much larger drop in the prey population (e.g., to 200) and would
not include the subsequent rise (e.g., to 750). As the imprecise prediction does not specify the
extent of the population drop, we might fail to recognise the true cause of the drop in the prey
population and intervene ineffectively (i.e., by controlling the predators).
The second version of the criticism is even more pragmatic. Even if we latch on to the
accurate mechanism causing the population drop, then the lack of precise information could
also cause us to intervene ineffectively. For example, a small drop, say to 750 individuals, does
not usually require an intervention (the population will often bounce back on its own), whereas
a larger drop, e.g., to 200 individuals, can be much more dangerous and merit an intervention if
7The other most common characteristic of riskiness is novelty. A discussion of novelty is beyond the scope of
this paper, but see (Hitchcock and Sober 2004; Douglas and Magnus 2013).
8Rosenberg uses this criticism in his attack on Keynesian macroeconomic models, which he believes led to
ineffective interventions on the economy (1989, 58–59).
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the population is to be conserved. With just the output of the imprecise model, scientists are at
risk of not realizing that an intervention is necessary if the population drop is large. Alternatively,
they might spend scarce resources to intervene without it being necessary if the population drop
is small.
These are the strongest criticisms of imprecise model predictions, because they address the
twomost important roles any scientific prediction ought to embody. If they cannot be overcome,
then there is really no reason to invest time, energy and funding on imprecise predictions.
4 Defending Imprecise Predictions
4.1 The Case of the North Island Kōkako
TheNorth Island kōkako is a bird endemic to New Zealand with a beautiful song (Ramsey and
Veltman 2005, henceforth R&V). In 1999 the species was reduced to 400 pairs. The cause of
the kōkako decline was predation. This is not surprising, in itself, but there are three main bird
predators in New Zealand, the so-called ‘unholy trinity’: rats, possums and stoats. As resources
were limited, it was important to determine which of these predators to focus on primarily, and
the extent to which each population needed to be culled. To make matters worse, the policy
needed to be researched and implemented before the kōkako numbers dropped further.
R&V used two imprecise models to analyse the dynamics of the kōkako community and to
predict the effect of interventions on that community for the kōkako population. The first model
was loop analysis (outlined in section 2) and was used to identify all the dynamic relationships
between populations in the community, along with their quality (positive, neutral or negative).
Adding up the number of positive neutral and negative effects reveals the overall effect of each
population on the others. In this case, loop analysis predicted that the rat population had the
overall most important effect on the kōkako.
The secondmodel was a ‘fuzzy interaction web’ (FIW). FIWs take imprecise information on
the abundances of populations within an ecological community, i.e., population abundance data
that is incomplete or imprecise, and create ‘fuzzy sets’. This is because it is practically impossible
to determine the exact size of each population, and consequently the precise rates of competition
and predation within the community. The scientists express this uncertainty through ‘fuzziness’
i.e., each element can have partial membership of a set, and/or can belong to multiple sets.
To clarify, let us start with what the scientists do know. They canmeasure ‘tracking rates’, i.e.,
the percentage of traps that are full on any given night. They then determine the ‘indexes’ of each
population i.e., what counts as low, medium or high abundance. This is based on comparing the
tracking rates with existing data of past tracking rates (in this case the data stretched back more
than 10 years). For example, in this community, when 20% or above of the traps each night are
full, this counts as high abundance, whereas an index of below 10% represents low abundance.
However, as the scientists at no point know the exact size of any population, this index is an
estimate, hence the intermediate percentages have partial membership in high, medium and low
abundances (see figure 2). In other words, by fuzzifying the membership in each set (high,
medium, low), the scientists are incorporating the inherent uncertainties of each population
size estimate.
With the indexes in place, the scientists can make predictions about the effect of each popu-
lation on the other populations in the community. Figure 3 summarises the predictions yielded
by the FIW. It shows that controlling all three populations would have a high effect on the
kōkako population, however, controlling rats and possums would have a moderate effect on
the kōkako population. Given the population indexes mentioned above, a moderate effect is
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Figure 2: Fuzzy set membership functions for linguistic descriptions of species abundances (‘low’,
‘mod(erate)’, ‘high’) for each of the animal species in the kōkako Fuzzy Interaction Web (reprinted with
permission from R&V, supplementary materials)
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Figure 3: Fuzzy Interaction Web Predictions: Imprecise predictions of the magnitude of the effect on
the equilibrium kōkako fledgling rate resulting from sustained single and multispecies control of nest
predators from the FIW ‘trained’ model. (Reprinted with permission from R&V.)
sufficient for bringing back the kōkako population to acceptable levels, thus the most efficient
intervention should focus on the rats and possums. More specifically, the FIW predicted that
the rats need to be kept at a tracking rate of “about 11% or lower” and possums at a tracking
rate “below about 10%”, so that the kōkako population is maintained at “moderate levels” (R&V,
914).
This example reveals two important points about the value of imprecise model predictions.
The first is that both models are genuinely imprecise (loop analysis corresponds to level (d),
and FIWs correspond to level (c) in the classification outlined in section 2). At no point do
the scientists have precise estimations of each population or even precise estimations of what
percentage of the population should be culled. Instead, they can make comparisons between
the strength of the effects between the populations of the community and imprecise estimates
of tracking rates. That is, they do not need to know how large the populations actually are, they
merely need to know to keep culling until the tracking rates are below a certain percentage.
This is actually important practical advantage of imprecise models. A common problem in
ecology (and other disciplines) is paucity of data: often, the data we want are difficult to obtain,
or even unavailable. For example, the capture-recapture method is perhaps the most widely
used sampling method in ecology yet does not work equally well for all species/populations.
It is not very useful in cases where capture or recapture is difficult, and it can result in biased
samples. For instance, in some fish species, capture methods are biased towards larger fish,
skewing demographic information (Pine et al. 2003).
In cases like these, imprecise rather than highly precise models may be superior. There have
been studies that compare the success rates of imprecise and highly precise predictions in a
number of contexts. Precise models tend to be much more susceptible to poor, biased or patchy
data, precisely because of their finely specified variables. For example, (Novak et al. 2011) found
that even if there is observational and experimental data on particular species within the ecosystem
but insufficient data on the indirect effects of each interaction on other populations within the
ecosystem or other dynamics, the predictive accuracy of highly precise models dwindles rapidly
(e.g., to about the level of flipping a coin). In addition, the process of transforming imprecise
data to precise variables for highly precise models is generally ill-advised, because while it results
in model outputs that are precise numbers, they are often wildly inaccurate (e.g., population in
the future is much larger/smaller than the model predicts), or not particularly illuminating (e.g.,
the sign (+/−) of the number can vary, which means that we cannot be sure that the interaction
is positive or negative) (Dambacher, Li, and Rossignol 2003).
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The second point directly addresses the issue of riskiness andmodel choice. A non-risky predic-
tion is that all predator populations have negative effects on the kōkako. This is quite intuitive.
Moreover, it would not be falsified if culling any one, two or all three predator populations had
the desired effect on the kōkako. However, neither loop analysis nor the FIWs made that pre-
diction. As we saw, in both cases the models predicted that culling all three predators would
have a positive effect on the kōkako population, yet they both made the much riskier prediction
that this intervention was unnecessary, and that the intervention could focus on just the rat
population (loop analysis) or the rat and possum population (FIW).
In fact, as the two models made different predictions, this gives us an opportunity to test
each model. This is precisely what the scientists did in their paper, revealing an important
flaw in loop analysis that could be overcome with the FIW. This is because in loop analysis,
the (strong) negative feedback cycle (between rats and stoats) was counteracted by 2 (weak)
positive feedback cycles. As loop analysis cannot distinguish between feedback cycle strengths,
the prediction of the effect was lost. In contrast, the FIW examined the effect of each pair of
predators on the kōkako population. Thus, it predicted that the stoat population is affected by
the rat population, hence a reduction in the rat population would lead to a reduction in the stoat
population. This means that intervening on the rat population renders intervention on the stoat
population unnecessary, but also controlling the possum population would make the intervention
more successful.
I should note that ecologists working with imprecise model predictions are remarkably care-
ful in using and testing their models. As stated above, Novak et al. (2011) compared the predic-
tive success of imprecise and highly precise models, showing the advantages and limitations of
each. R&V were aware of the limitations of loop analysis, hence used a second model to test the
data. Furthermore, they actually examined the possibility of using highly precise models for the
kōkako community and showed that the available data on the estimates of interaction strengths
did not conform to the parameters required by highly precise models, so that they resulted in
wildly inaccurate results (906).
Moving to the second criticism, did these predictions support effective interventions? They
did. The case of the kōkako is actually a heartening success story of interventionist conservation.
Today, there are about 1600 pairs dispersed over 22 different sites. 10 of these populations have
been recovered and an additional 12 have been newly established. The plans continue in the
future, with the goal being to increase the population to 3000 pairs by 2025 (New Zealand
Department of Conservation 2017).
As it turns out, we also know that the model predictions I have discussed were actually used
in the intervention on the kōkako and were instrumental in saving the population from extinc-
tion. One of the paper’s authors (Veltman), was based at the Science and Research Unit of the
New Zealand Department of Conservation, which was in charge of the kōkako conservation
project. In addition, other papers she (co)authored include research on direct and indirect ef-
fects of pest (rat, stoat, and possum) control on ecological communities (Tompkins and Veltman
2006). This work was part of a larger project within the Department of Conservation, contribut-
ing to a paper on imprecise models for control of deer, which are also a pest in New Zealand
(Ramsey et al. 2012). In addition, subsequent publications of the Department of Conservation
incorporate the research and recommendations from papers by these scientists (see, for example,
Brown, Elliott, and Kemp 2015).
To sum up, the case of the north Island kōkako provides us with an example of imprecise
model predictions that were both risky and supported effective interventions. Yet the kōkako
case required immediate intervention and was constrained by paucity of data. How often do
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these types of situations come about? In other words, what is the scope of imprecise model
predictions in scientific practice? I will address this worry in the next section.
4.2 The Role of Imprecise Model Predictions in Scientific Practice
What exactly is the role of imprecise model predictions in scientific practice? When should
scientists prefer models with imprecise predictions over models with precise predictions? My
aim in this section is not to claim that imprecise predictions are always preferable to maximally
precise ones. That claim would be clearly false. However, I am claiming that there are some
contexts in which imprecise predictions are consistently preferable. The most comprehensive
account of the context for imprecise predictions can be found in the work of Richard Levins.
A substantial part of his work was geared towards creating the conceptual space and provid-
ing support for qualitative analysis and imprecise modelling ( Justus 2006). His seminal paper
on different strategies for model-building (Levins 1966) can be understood, in part, as provid-
ing a theoretical argument for model diversity, which includes the motivation for constructing
imprecise models (Weisberg 2006).
Thismotivation is key to understanding the importance of imprecise predictions for scientific
practice. Levins famously pointed out that systems in the natural world are very complex (i.e.,
made up of many interacting parts), and that this complexity cannot be incorporated in our
models, in its entirety. We aim to maximize the quality of our models by making them as precise,
realistic and general as possible, yet complexity results in a tradeoff between these desiderata.
Only two of the three desiderata can be maximized in each model, thus giving rise to three
strategies for model building (each sacrificing one desideratum and maximizing the other two)
and three corresponding types of models.
In this context, imprecise modelling, which produces imprecise predictions as its output, is
one of three legitimate strategies for model-building (type III). That is, by sacrificing precision,
imprecise models are able to maximize the other two desiderata. First, by sacrificing precision
instead of realism they are said to contain idealizations of specificity rather than idealizations of
veracity ( Justus 2006, 659). That is, imprecise models represent systems veridically, yet are
simplified in the sense that particular properties are represented with low degrees of specificity.
For example, the FIW included all populations in the community, the resources (fruit and
foliage) and all the interactions between each population, i.e., not just the effect of each predator
on the kōkako. The simplification here was that no population size was represented precisely.
In contrast, maximally precise models (usually type I, sacrificing realism for generality and
precision) employ differentmethods of simplification, i.e., making unrealistic assumptions and/or
omitting causal factors altogether. For example, the most common alternative to imprecise mod-
els for community interactions is a version of the Lotka-Volterra predation model.9 This model
does not include the resources (fruit and foliage), and simplifies the interactions between each
population, i.e., it does not separately identify the interactions between each population in the
community (see footnote 7, R&V, 906, and Dambacher et al. 2003 for a full explanation of
the details). Not all factors make it into the model and many that do are simplified, decreasing
the ‘veracity’ of the model. The problem is that this type of idealization often mischaracterizes
9The version presented in R&V is a multi-species interaction model, described by the equation dNi/dt =
fi(N)i = 1, 2, . . . , s, where Ni is the density of species i, N is the vector of s species densities N1, N2, . . . Ns,
and fi is the function describing the growth rate of species i. The partial derivative of fi with respect to species
j at equilibrium growth rates yields aij = ∂fi/∂Nj . Based on this, the scientists construct a community matrix
to make predictions based on a sustained increase or decrease of any of the community’s members (all the matrix’s
elements are represented together the term aij , so any change in one of the community members reflects a change
in aij) (906).
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salient features of systems, resulting in inaccurate explanations and/or predictions ( Justus 2005,
2006). In the above example, the idealizations of veracity result in the models not being able to
predict the effects of large perturbations or non-linear interactions, which are very common in
real communities (R&V, 906; Dambacher et al. 2003, 80).
Second, allowing for imprecision results in higher levels of generality, i.e., the models are
not tied to a particular system, but applicable to many (different) systems. Generalizing results
can be very useful, because it allows scientists to make connections (comparisons, contrasts)
across systems. In some cases, general models can pave the way to unifying explanations that
subsume a large number of phenomena (Weisberg 2006). The problem in complex systems, is
that generality is usually either abandoned (type II models) or achieved at the expense of realism
(type I models), models that are applicable widely but whose explanations and predictions are
often inaccurate (Elliott-Graves 2018). In contrast, by sacrificing precision, ecologists such as
Levins were able to construct models that were widely applicable to many different populations
in different environments, but also realistic, incorporating many of the salient variables for each
population and thus minimizing the risk of inaccuracies.
The tradeoff account provides the basic insight of how complexity10 causes difficulties study-
ing ecological systems but does not adequately capture the extent of these difficulties. First,
many ecological models incorporate complexity (type II models). Second, scientists in other
fields that study complex systems, such as physics and chemistry, do not seem to face such ex-
tensive tradeoffs ( Justus 2005 inMatthewson 2011). A Boeing 747 is a complex entity, yet once
we have knowledge of how one Boeing 747 works, we can generalize to other cases and make
accurate predictions about a range of flight trajectories, etc. (Matthewson 2011).
The answer lies in another feature that magnifies the tradeoff between generality realism
and precision. Causal heterogeneity occurs when the parts that make up a system are themselves
diverse (Elliott-Graves 2018).11 That is, ecosystems or economies are not like aeroplanes; none
is identical to the others. This means that generalising across systems is often difficult or even
impossible, as knowledge of what happens in one system does not necessarily apply to other
systems, even if they seem similar at first glance. This is precisely what has happened in many
cases of simple, precise and general models (type I) in ecology, where a model that works for
one system produces inaccurate predictions in other systems. For example, general models of
competition, that apply well to animal populations often yield inaccurate predictions for plant
populations (Berger et al. 2008). In contrast, imprecise models can incorporate a much larger
number of causal factors, without being tied to a particular system, because outputs are specified
imprecisely. For example, a loop analysis model for a community of n species will be applicable
to all communities of n species, irrespective of their geographical location, and will include
all interactions between populations and resources. Thus, it will capture every single relevant
interaction and its quality (positive, neutral or negative), though it will not specify its magnitude.
This is especially pertinent in the case of prediction because generalizations across time are
also often unwarranted (Elliott-Graves 2018). Even if scientists have adequate knowledge of
the functioning of a system at a particular time, the existence of dynamics, feedback, threshold
effects, etc. mean that this knowledge might not be projectable into the future. For example,
current knowledge of how insects deal with the cold during wintertime might not result in
10In this context (and literature), complexity is usually understood to mean the following: a system is complex
when it has many interacting parts (Elliott-Graves 2018; Levins 1966; Matthewson andWeisberg 2009; Matthew-
son 2011). Systems are also sometimes described as complex when they exhibit emergent behaviours (Matthewson
2011).
11A full examination of causal heterogeneity and all its effects on scientific practice is beyond the scope of this
paper but can be found in Elliott-Graves 2018.
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accurate predictions of native and invasive insect abundances in the light of climate change
(Marshall and Sinclair 2012; Kaunisto, Ferguson, and Sinclair 2016).
To sum up the argument so far, sacrificing realism in complex heterogeneous systems is
dangerous, because we need sufficient causal information in order to make accurate predictions.
The causal heterogeneity here matters more than the complexity. As stated above, models that
sacrifice realism leave out causal factors, and focus on a small subset of them. This is not a
problem in complex systems if the factors that remain in the model are the relevant causal
factors whereas the factors left out aremere details. The problem in causally heterogeneous systems
is that they differ in terms of causes. Thus, any time a factor is left out, it has a much higher
chance of being relevant. In these types of cases, imprecise model predictions have a higher
chance of providing accurate predictions, hence should preferred, or at the very least, genuinely
considered.
Finally, even if this argument is persuasive within the context described, a critic of imprecise
predictions can still maintain that this context is an example of non-ideal or immature science.
For example, Rosenberg allowed that imprecise predictions in economics can be useful in cer-
tain cases, though he maintained that they should be superseded by more precise predictions
whenever and wherever possible. If a science is to be considered fully mature, then scientists
should do whatever it takes to get closer to the ideal of maximal precision. The implication is
that the difficulties leading to the use of imprecise models are practical, such as lack of data,
poor quality data, working under time constraints (all of which apply to the kōkako case). But,
the argument goes, with time, scientists will build more extensive data sets and get better knowl-
edge of the systems they are investigating so that maximally precise predictions will be possible
and imprecise predictions superfluous. Therefore, scientists should not become complacent and
accept that imprecise predictions are good enough, even if they occasionally are useful.
The problem with this criticism is that it is based on a misunderstanding. Complexity and
causal heterogeneity are not artefacts of our scientific methods, but intrinsic factors of many
systems under investigation. Moreover, they are factors that cannot be overcome, even as science
progresses. Even if we acquire more data and gain a better understanding of each system we
study, this does not mean that the same causal factors will be relevant in other systems or at other
times. This may seem far from our picture of an ‘ideal’ science, but it does not mean that we
can shoehorn these systems into the pre-existing ideal. As we have seen, ignoring or reducing
complexity and causal heterogeneity in our models often makes our scientific investigations
worse, as the subsequent predictions are inaccurate. Yet we have an alternative option for these
cases, namely sacrificing precision with imprecise models. As Levins and others have shown,
this is a legitimate option, which is underutilized. It is perhaps this preoccupationwith a singular
conception of an ‘ideal science’ that has led us to overlook the contexts in which imprecise
predictions are useful and thus undervalue them.
5 Conclusion
Imprecise predictions are undervalued in philosophy of science, as there is some confusion about
how they should be defined, and because they are mistakenly thought to be opaque, mathemati-
cally suspect or useless. I have shown that a large and important subset of imprecise predictions
are not subject to these criticisms and in certain contexts they outperform precise predictions.
While most of the examples of this analysis were from ecology, a discipline where imprecise
predictions have been used and evaluated more thoroughly, the classification and defence of
imprecise predictions can be applied to other disciplines that face similar issues of uncertainty
and causal heterogeneity, such as economics and climate science.
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